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I. INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
This case involves two major issues. The first is a legal question of first impression 
involving the fundamental right of Idaho employers to be free from unreasonable searches. 
The second involves the future viability of probationary sentences in light of the ever-
increasing importance of computers and data security in the modem world. MLDC Government 
Services Corp. (hereafter ''MLDC") performs a societal service by providing quality employment 
to a probationer and now finds itself threatened with the warrantless search of its property, even 
though there is no allegation that MLDC did anything wrong or illegal. It is important for this 
Court to understand why MLDC needs the laptop returned, along with any images, copies, or 
other data from its hard drive. 
MLDC is in the business of contracting with the Federal Government. Their main areas 
of work include remote construction, facility improvements, and security upgrades, providing 
logistical support and supplying various items including construction materials and energy to 
civilian and military facilities. Many of these contracts are performed at civilian and military 
installations, including those with strategic importance and national security significance. 
MLDC receives communications from the Federal Government transferred via the 
internet and/or stored on electronic media including: blueprints, construction details, base 
specifications, current and proposed security procedures, protocols and equipment, base passes, 
routine schedules of refueling routes, and times and schedules of strategic personnel and 
shipments, as well as other sensitive information that has been restricted by the Federal 
Government. MLDC's business depends on the ability to keep confidential information secret. 
MLDC's databases include information which, if improperly disseminated, could potentially be 
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used to breach security at multiple installations including but not limited to Department of 
Homeland Security offices, Transportation and Security Administration facilities, Customs and 
Border Protection locations and military installations. 
Probationer Matt Ruck's, (hereinafter "Ruck") employment consists of reviewing 
proposed contracts, determining price points and profitability of projects, and bringing them to 
management to determine whether or not to take these projects on. If the particular contracts are 
awarded, he, as well as other employees, maintain contract schedules, work with vendors, 
subcontractors, and Government agencies to ensure proper contract performance and completion. 
Many of these contracts run over the course of several years. Ruck is responsible to perform 
tasks assigned to him by his employer in connection with these contracts at various points all 
over the country and in some cases abroad. 
Ruck's employment requires periodic use of a corporate laptop so he can do his job while 
out of the office and have the ability to link to the corporate servers and Government databases. 
A search of the computer in question will cause unauthorized people to access 
confidential information. If MLDC's ability to keep confidential information is compromised, 
they are out of business. This court will essentially be punishing MLDC for helping society by 
gainfully employing a probationer at the full level of the probationer's skill. This is the very 
same probationer that has been vetted and authorized by the Federal Government to do this very 
job. 
The State is essentially asking this Court to rule that anytime an employer hires a 
probationer who uses the employer's computer off-site on a job or at home that is or can be 
connected to corporate servers and mainframes, the employer forfeits all constitutional 
protections for its confidential information and property. The ramifications arc catastrophic. 
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Think of how many employees log in to a server to check their work email, arrange a calendar 
for their supervisor, or fill in blanks with random data entry onto a server from a satellite 
location; the examples could go on and on. To hold that a corporation loses its reasonable 
expectation of privacy on any computer or smart phone used by any employee will surely cause a 
dramatic reduction in the likelihood of a probationer finding skilled employment. 
In this new day and age of Laptops, iPhones, Electronic Tablets, PD A's, and other items 
that link directly into corporate servers and mainframes, it is necessary that sensitive information 
that is protected by employers remain protected by the Idaho Supreme Court. When it becomes 
widely understood that employing a probationer might subject the employer's property to 
warrantless searches, who will employ a probationer? 
To eliminate the ability of Idaho citizens on probation to get jobs where the use of 
technology is prevalent will be to limit rehabilitation to the detriment of probationers, and 
society. 
Do we want to force Idaho citizens with special skill sets who are on probation to apply 
only for manual labor jobs to feed, in this case, a family of six? 
The State's argument in this case targets the reasonableness of probationer searches by 
analogizing co-habitation cases that have limited relevance. The State has ignored clear on-point 
case law provided in Petitioner's brief, such as US v. Carey which clearly held "that consent to 
seizure of 'any property' under the defendant's control and to 'a complete search of the premises 
and property' at the defendant's address merely permitted the agents to seize the defendant's 
computer from his apartment, not to search the computer off-site because it was no longer 
located at the defendant's address.'' 172 F.3d 1268, 1274 (I 0th Cir. 1999). 
Where the State's analysis has gone wrong is that it treated this matter like an appeal on a 
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motion to suppress and analyzed this search from the point of seizure of property. This is wrong. 
MLDC is not charged with any offense and is not moving for suppression of evidence of a crime, 
because no crime has been committed; nor is there any evidence to suppress. MLDC is seeking 
the return of corporate property that was wrongfully seized without a warrant. And yes, we do 
contend that the initial search and subsequent seizure was indeed impermissible, but more 
importantly, we are contending that the continued indefinite retention of M LDC's property, 
without cause and after presentation of unchallenged evidence that the computer belongs to 
MLDC, is impermissible and unlawful. MLDC is entitled to have the use of its property where 
there was and is no basis for the State to get a warrant to search or seize it. The State has had 
eighteen months since the seizure to apply for a warrant if the facts had justified one. 
MLDC respectfully asks this Court to uphold the United States Constitution as well as the 
Idaho Constitution and protect the corporation from this unlawful search and seizure of their 
property without a warrant. 
II. THE STATE'S ARGUMENT THAT THERE WAS " ... NO ERROR 
BECAUSE THE LAPTOP WAS REASONABLY SHOWN TO HAVE BEEN 
IN PROBATIONERS RUCK'S POSSESSION." HAS NO MERIT. 
Mere possession of an item by one person cannot give rise to the destruction of 
constitutional rights of another. If that were the case, every time an employee logs on to a work 
computer with internal access to files he would be forfeiting his employer's constitutional 
protections. The State argues its main point in its introduction: that there was" ... no error 
because the laptop was reasonably shown to have been in probationer Ruck's possession." Br. of 
Respt. 7 (Nov. 8, 2012). 
The State then contradicts its main argument four pages later, where it argues '"[t]he scope 
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of a probation search is not based on mere possession ... " Id. at l l . So which is it? Is the search 
(and subsequent seizure) valid because of mere possession or do we need more to conduct the 
search rather than mere possession? 
The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that allowing someone to use your computer 
does not extinguish privacy expectations. See U.S. v. Heckencarnp 482 F.3d l l 42, I 146-1147 
(9th Cir. 2007) citing Leventhal v. Knapeck 266 F. 3d 64, 74 (2d Cir. 2001) holding that others 
having access to a computer does not diminish the owner of the computer's expectation of 
privacy. The Court specifically stated: "However, the mere act of accessing a network does not 
in itself extinguish privacy expectations, nor does the fact that others may have occasional access 
to the computer. Leventhal v. Knapek, 266 F.3d 64, 74 (2d Cir.2001 )." U.S. v. Heckenkamp 482 
F.3d 1142, 1146, 1147 (9111 Cir. 2007). 
Furthermore, if mere possession gives rise to permissible searches then the State could 
search the laptop now because it resides in the State's possession. This obviously cannot be the 
rule. We cannot provide incentive for the State to just seize property with no evidence or 
indication that any contraband or illegal material is contained within it, making a subsequent 
search proper through brute force and taking. 
If possession by the probationer were really the test, that possession is clearly over, thus 
negating any allowable search based on possession alone and previous case law. Please see U.S. 
v. 172 F.3d 1268 which held that authority to consent to search that was based upon 
possession or consent to search property under defendant's control did not allow an off-site 
search because it was no longer within that consent after it left defendant's address and control. 
The State in their brief does not even attempt to distinguish Carey or even mention it. 
The Court needs to answer the question: Do the computers belonging to employers 
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become subject to warrantless seizures and searches simply because a probationer has had access 
to the computer or even temporary physical control over it in order to do the probationer's job? 
The cases upon which the State relies have never addressed or answered this question. 
MLDC is not seeking some kind of suppression, but return of its property under seal to 
prevent the of confidential information and an unconstitutional search of its computer. 
"The constant element in assessing Fourth Amendment reasonableness in such cases is 
the great significance given to widely shared social expectations, which are influenced by 
property law but not controlled by its rules." Georgia v. Randolph U.S. 103, 103 (2006) 
Thus the test here is whether or not under the totality of the circumstances the State has 
reasonable suspicion to believe that Ruck had the type of authority over the Laptop which would 
permit consent to its search or seizure, and more pointedly, whether there is reasonable suspicion 
to believe that Ruck has such authority over it now. 
It is clear and undisputed that MLDC is the owner of the laptop. It is also undisputed that 
MLDC controls the Laptop. MLDC sets the policies for use, restricts use to employment matters 
(See Appendix l, attached, for Employers Policy given to Ruck), sets the security policies, 
decides who can and who cannot sign out the computers, regulates the password policies, 
chooses the antivirus software, chooses the server, and now chooses not to surrender its Fourth 
Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. 
Thus, the Ruck has no authority to consent to a search of MLDC's computer and 
database. 
There has been no evidence presented by the State to contradict the facts presented that 
Ruck had and has no authority, apparent or actual. "As in the case with other warrantless 
searches, the state must carry the burden of showing that the search is reasonable." State v. 
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Pinson 657 P.2d I 095, 1100 (Idaho App. 1983). The State has not met that burden, providing no 
evidence that the search is now reasonable under any circumstances. The State has shown no 
evidence that there is reasonable suspicion of any particular evidence on MLDC's computer that 
would reveal a probation violation. The State has no indication pointing to the existence of any 
current item or file on the computer. They basically have an unknown electronic locked file 
cabinet belonging to MLDC and they would like a look-sec without obtaining a warrant. 
Even if we assume that Probationer Ruck, without authority to do so, gave consent to 
search, that "consent" can be revoked! "A consent to search is not irrevocable, and thus if a 
person effectively revokes ... consent prior to the time the search is completed, then the police 
may not thereafter search in reliance upon the earlier consent" U.S. v. Lattimore, 87 F. 3d 647, 
651 (4th Cir. 1996), (quoting 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure§ 8.2(f), at 674 (3d 
ed.1996)). To avoid any mistake in perception, the President of MLDC on the record revoked 
any deemed consent. R. Vol. 11, p. 190, L. 6-9. 
There is absolutely no evidence that Ruck has now or ever had any actual or apparent 
authority over the computer. Did MLDC do everything it could to secure the Laptop while in the 
employee's possession? Yes. They password protected the laptop. They submitted written 
security policies on the laptop. R. Vol. II, p. I 82. They had written policies restricting the use of 
the Corporation's computers to the Corporation's work (Sec Appendix 1 ). MLDC did everything 
in their power to restrict the use of the laptop and to secure the field computer to maintain its 
expectation of privacy. 
The State relies on State v Barker 136 Idaho 728 (Idaho 2002) and State v. 144 
Idaho 906 (Idaho App. 2007) to uphold its proposition that mere possession of property gives rise 
to automatic search. Notwithstanding and ignoring the fact that there is no reasonable suspicion 
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that the Laptop contains any contraband 1, both cases are distinguishable. 
Barker and Cruz are distinguishable in many ways from the case at hand, but maybe none 
as important as the context of the relationships of the third parties to the probationer; both are co-
habitation cases. The United States Supreme Court highlighted the analysis in Georgia v. 
Randolph: "The constant element in assessing Fourth Amendment reasonableness in such cases 
is the great significance given to widely shared social expectations, which are influenced by 
property law but not controlled by its rules." 547 U.S. 103, 103 (2006). Thus, different 
relationships and social expectations give rise to different expectations of privacy. The Supreme 
Court in Randolph listed two habitation case examples where one needs to look at the historical 
context and social expectations to obtain a proper reasonableness standard to apply to third party 
consent searches. The Supreme Court listed Chapman v. U.S. 365 U.S. 610 (1961) where a 
landlord was denied authority to consent to a search and Stoner v. Calife>rnia, 3 76 U.S. 483 
( 1964) which involved the hotel manager in a similar context. 
The Co-habitants in Barker shared the master bedroom. Tate (the probationer) had a key 
to the house, narcotics officer observed Tate in the residence, two vehicles were parked at 
Barker's apartment, and there were men's clothing and shoes in the master closet. The Co-
habitant in Cruz was selling narcotics out of a studio apartment that he had been residing in 
periodically with his girlfriend. These co-habitation cases must be analyzed differently from our 
case. 
The relationship in our case is that of master/servant or employer/employee. Further 
1 Seized ticket Stubs and airline travel receipts give NO suspicion of any kind, reasonable or unreasom1ble. that this 
particular laptop contains evidence of any contraband. Seizing indefinitely a corporate container (Laptop) that the 
State has NO idea what is contained upon ii. cannot lead lo reasonable suspicion whatsoever. There is no indication 
that there is evidence that there are even emails or video games on this computer. Seizing the corporate laptop. 
while ignoring the seizure of the personal iPad in the backpack. as well as ignoring the Probationer's home 
computers, demonstrates other motives. 1 f the probationer's personal emai I was indeed a target it remains accessible 
lo the probation department lo this day. This is a targeted search al the corporation and their properly lo circumvent 
!he warrant requirement. 
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complicating matters is that the corporate computer connects into the corporate server and 
mainframe and has downloaded sensitive documents. The reasonableness standard is different 
from co-habitation cases because the social expectations and protections of legitimate third party 
rights in the property of an employer need to be viewed differently from roommates using a 
common living room or space. In so much as a landlord cannot give permission to search his 
own rental property that a tenant rents or a hotel or hotel manager cannot give permission to 
search the hotel room of a guest, an employee cannot give authority for someone to search 
property in which he has no authority to do so. Additionally, Barker and Cruz deal with 
suppression issues following a search that uncovered illegal material. These were on-the-spot 
searches where reasonableness of error often can carry the day. Here we are not seeking 
suppression; this is not a fruit of the poisonous tree issue. This is an issue of return of corporate 
property that was seized without a warrant where reasonableness cannot continue to provide 
justification. The State can no longer pretend that it believes that this is not a corporate computer 
to give them basis to make a reasonable mistake. 
Our situation here is further distinguished from Barker and Cruz in that there were actual 
indications of contraband found in these two cases. This is not like Barker with a drug dog 
pointing at a fanny pack full of drugs. Nor is this like Cruz where an anonymous tip led to 
discovery of drugs in the probationer's hand, where he admitted the drugs were his. We have a 
scenario where a digital password protected container, owned by another party, that has nothing 
inherently illicit about it, was seized for later search for possible evidence that may or may not 
exist. 
The question of third party credibility also distinguishes Barker. The Court in Barker 
gave weight to the fact that Barker was not credible in some of her assertions and that the 
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officers therefore had reason to question Barker's assertion of ownership of the fanny pack. The 
Court's discussion of credibility in Barker indicates that the ruling would have been different if 
Barker's assertion of ownership of the fanny pack had been credible, and the officers knew they 
were searching a third party's belongings without a warrant. 
Here, in our facts, we have had the President of MLDC testify in open court that the 
corporation owns and controls the computer; we have evidence on the scene of the initial seizure 
with all indications pointing to the fact that the corporation is the true owner and held all 
authority over the computer. Further proving the contention that this was a work computer, the 
Probationer had another computer, an Apple iPad, that was also found in the backpack with the 
business computer and seized. The iPad was the Probationer's personal computer. Also several 
home computers possibly containing personal emails and personal financial records remained 
untouched by the Probation Department. The question you would have to ask yourself is, if this 
wasn't a work computer, why would anyone carry two computers if they didn't have a restriction 
on their work laptop regarding personal use? 
The State argues that Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006) allows the State to 
search the computer without suspicion. "We further observed that, by virtue of their status alone, 
probationers" 'do not enjoy "the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled," ' "Knights, 
supra, at I 19, 122 S.Ct. 587 (quoting Griffin, supra, at 874, 107 S.Ct. 3 I 64, in turn quoting 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 4 71, 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 ( 1972)), justifying the 
"impos[ition] [of] reasonable conditions that deprive the offender of some freedoms enjoyed by 
la\v-abiding citizens," Knights, supra, at 119, 122 S.Ct. 587. Samson v. Ca!ifhrnia, 547 U.S. 
843, 848-849 (2006). 
The point that the State is missing is that it is requesting the right to search the property 
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of an innocent third party (or his, hers or its property), a party that clearly enjoys the absolute 
liberty to which every citizen is entitled. The State cannot search an innocent third party without 
a warrant and now the State tries to spin the holding of Samson to allow them to do so, despite 
the clear evidence that this is not the Probationer's property or under his control. 
The State further argues that "MLDC's proposed standard of depriving the probation 
officer the ability to search any item or container he seized is obviously flawed." Br. of Res pt. 
11:7-8 (Nov. 8, 2012). 
MLDC's proposed standard is not the oversimplified broad statement the State says it is. 
MLDC's proposed standard is this: If the State seizes property that it is initially told is third party 
property, and confirms later at a hearing that it is indeed employer third party property, that the 
property was used only for business purposes, that the property contained confidential 
information from the federal government that could be a crime to view without the proper 
security clearance, and that the property was a laptop container, then the State should give it back 
or get a warrant to search it. Furthermore, it is not MLDC's proposed standard. It is the standard 
of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 
The pending search and possession must be now analyzed not only from the time of 
seizure, but from the time of the first hearing and al I subsequent time. We now know that this 
computer belongs to and is controlled by the third pai1y employer. There has been no showing 
that Probationer Ruck possessed the type of authority needed to authorize a search of his 
employer's stored electronic information. 
III. CONCLUSION 
MLDC has proven the Laptop is theirs: the State does not dispute this. What authority 
docs the State now have to hold the computer? An even better question is if there was illegal 
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material on the computer, why should this Court not make the State get a wan-ant? This case 
screams warrant requirement! We have property that is in the protection of the State; property 
that is clearly not spoiling and has no chance of being destroyed. Instead the State clings to its 
notion that they should be able to search a party's property without a wan-ant because it was once 
in the possession of a probationer, which is clearly not the law. The State has not provided any 
evidence to controvert the testimony of the President of MLDC, which proved that all authority 
and control resided with the corporation. Because the Constitution mandates protection of an 
innocent party we request that this Court order the Laptop and any images or copies turned over 
to their rightful owner. 
Respectfully Submitted this Twenty Ninth day of November, 2012. 
The Law Offices of Magyar, Rauch & Thie, PLLC 
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IV. CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 29th day of November, 2012, I caused two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed in the United States 
mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
700 West Jefferson Street, Suite 210 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Atotrney General 
Chief~ Criminal Law Division 
P. 0. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P. 0. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
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Gregory R. 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
V. Appendix 1 
Excerpt of En1ployee Manual Dated 3117 II 0 given to all MLDC Employees 
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lVILDC Government Services Corp 
Employee lVIanual; Policies and Procedures 
Company Property and Resources. 
The short answer is that personal use of company property is prohibited. That said under 
certain circumstances some exceptions can be made. Please talk to Mr. Fitt-Chappell if 
you have any questions or requests. 
Company tools and equipment is to be cleaned and stored properly after each use. Do 
NOT leave tools at job sites or in the back of vehicles. This is where theft and damage 
occur. Secure tools and equipment after each use. Do NOT leave keys in or on equipment 
when not in use and NEVER overnight. Your pocket is where they belong. 
Company vehicles arc for company purposes. If you have questions ask Mr. Fitt-Chappcll 
Company computers are for company purposes. NEVER download software, programs, 
videos, pictures or other to any company computer that is not for company purposes. 
When in doubt, ASK! This includes company laptops computers checked out by you. 
You are responsible until returned. If you want or need to make use of a computer for 
personal reasons while traveling on company business, it is recommended you make 
arrangements to have your own computer with you. Company laptops that are removed 
from service may be available for sale to employees, ask Mr. Fitt-Chappell. 
Company shirts and jackets issued to you are yours. It is expected that they will be kept 
in good repair and available for use for company purposes. If you need a new jacket or 
shirts please see Mr. Fitt-Chappell, depending on the circumstances they may require to 
be purchased. 
Company Supplies are for company purposes. Do NOT take home pens, paper, note pads, 
envelopes, stamps, or other office supplies. The biggest problem in corporate America 
today is employee theft. Taking home copy paper is theft, think about it. 
Company locations, facilities and offices are for company purposes. Please do not store 
personal items at these locations. If you have any questions please see Mr. Fitt-Chappell. 
When you arc done with work for the day, go home. People trying to work do not need 
the distraction of off duty employees just "hanging out". 
Company Resources. This is an area to cover anything not previously covered. This 
company is in the business of making money. If company resources are being consumed 
by employees for personal uses then it makes it harder to achieve the primary objective of 
making money. This may result in downsizing, layoffs and or terminations. Before you 
take home that ream of copy paper ask yourself its worth your job. 
Section II 
Rc1'iscd 3-/ 7-lO/O 
Use of Company Property and Resources 
pg l9 
